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New Protection for Defrauded Pledgees of Securities Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Rubin v. United States' — Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 (1933 Act)2 prohibits deceptive practices "in the offer or sale of any
securities."s Until the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rubin v.
United States,* federal circuit courts of appeals 5 had divide& over whether a
449 U.S. 424 (1981).
2 Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a) (1976), provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities .. directly
or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
The 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77aa (1976), was proposed and enacted in an effort to
control abuses in the securities markets which were believed to have been responsible in part for
the collapse of the stock market in 1929. See L. Loss, I SECURITIES REGULATIONS 127-30 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as LOSS]
The Senate Report on the bill that ultimately became the Securities Act of 1933 stated:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business.
The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities
to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection
against fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of un-
sound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation, to place
adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise,
seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by
dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to
bring into productive channels of industry and development capital which has
grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and
restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REPORT NO. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 17. 1 (). Ellenberger
and E. Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See generally United States
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 755-76 (1978) and Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041
(7th Cir. 1979) (both cases discuss the legislative history of the 1933 Act).
For a thoughtful discussion of the various theories connecting the stock market crash of
1929 with abuses in the securities markets see generally FitzGibbon, What is a Security? - A
Redefinition Based on Eligibility To Participate In The Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893,
912-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FitzGibbon].
3 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a) (1976). See note 1 supra for the text of 5 17(a). Section 17(a)'s
prohibitions may not extend to sellers of securities. See Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456
(6th Cir. 1970). 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 1423-24.
449 U.S. 424 (1981). See text and notes at notes 32-100 infra for discussion of case.
The first case addressing whether pledge transactions should be covered by the
regulatory design established in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77aa (1976), was
SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v.
SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
6 Compare United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466-467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976) (holding that a pledge is a sale) with National Bank of Commerce v. All Am.
Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a pledge is not a sale).
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pledge' of stock as collateral security° for a commercial loan constituted a
"sale" of a security under section 17(a). The definitional provision of the 1933
Act, section 2(3), 9
 provides that, "[t]he term sale or sell shall include every
contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value.'"° The controversy surrounding the reach of section 17(a) had focused
on whether this definition of "sale" encompassed pledge transactions.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the only circuit court to con-
clude that fraud in connection with a pledge of securities violates section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act." The court held that the language of section 2(3) and the pur-
pose of the 1933 Act required pledges to be treated as sales under the 1933
Act." The court reasoned that nothing in the definition of sale in section 2(3)
mandated the transfer of full title to a security before a sale is completed." To
support this position, the court noted that the disjunctive phrase "disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value"" in section 2(3) would be
rendered meaningless if only transfers of full titles constituted sales." The
court also observed that the primary purpose of the 1933 Act was to protect in-
vestors in securities from loss." It stated that one who accepts a pledge of stock
A pledge has been defined as "[a) bailment of goods to a creditor as security for some
debt or engagement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
8
 "The term 'collateral security' or 'collateral' means a pledge of incorporeal property
assigned or transferred and delivered by a debtor or someone for him to a creditor as security for
payment of a debt or the fulfillment of an obligation." L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
COLLATERAL SECURITIES AND PLEDGES, 5 1, at 2 (3d ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as JONES].
Hereinafter the technical term "collateral security" will be referred to as "collateral."
9
 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(3) (1976). Section 2(3) provides in relevant part:
(3) The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of
a security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell," "offer for
sale," or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.
10 Id.
" United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976). Prior to Gentile, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had addressed the issue of whether a
pledge is a sale under S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976).
McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930
(1975). In addition, in SEC v. Pig'N Whistle Corp., 359 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ill, 1973), the
district court judge concluded with no explanation that a pledge is a sale under both 5 17(a) and
S 5(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 55 77q(a), 77e(a) (1976). Id. at 221. In SEC v. Guild Films
Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819
(1960), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a pledge was a sale under the 1933 Act. It
did so in arriving at its conclusion that a pledgee is an underwriter of a security in some situations
under 5 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77d(1) (1976), for the purposes of the Act's registra-
tion requirements, Guild Films, 279 F.2d at 489. See 15 U.S.C. 77d(1) (1976). See note 19 infra
for a more detailed discussion of Guild Films. Other cases resolved that a pledge is a sale under the
1933 Act as well but did so in a context other than 5 17(a). See, e.g. , SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d
1279, 1282 (7th Cir. 1974) (registration requirements); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co.,
334 F. Supp. 444, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (registration requirements), aff'd, 447 F.2d 920, 921
(5th Cir. 1973).
12
 United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976).
13 Id.
" Id.
15 Id. at 467.
18 Id.
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as collateral for a commercial loan assumes the same risk of loss as does an in-
vestor." According to the court, such identical risk-taking requires equal pro-
tection under the Act." Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded that a pledge
of stock is a "sale" within the meaning of section 2(3) and that pledges are pro-
tected under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act."
Other courts addressing whether fraud connected with a pledge of
securities violates section 17(a) of the 1933 Act were unconvinced that a pledge
of stock as collateral for a commercial loan constituted a sale under the 1933
Act. 20
 These courts relied on the statutory language 2 ' and purposes 22 of the
1933 Act to conclude that the transfer of a partial interest in a security in a
pledge transaction does not constitute a sale. 23 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, for example, held that the definitions of "offer" and "sale" in section
2(3) of the 1933 Act are not broad enough to encompass pledges of stock. 24 The
court observed that Congress could have brought pledges within the definitions
of sale under section 2(3) by including specific words to that effect. 25 The lack
of any such specific language, the court reasoned, indicated that Congress did
not intend to regulate pledge transactions. 26 The court also stated that the 1933
Act's policy of protecting investors from loss would not be served by treating
pledges as sales." The court viewed pledgees and investors as assuming dif-
17 Id.
18 Id.
" In holding that a pledge is a sale under 5 2(3) of the 1933 Act, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals relied on its earlier decision, SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (1960). At issue in Guild Films was
whether a pledgee was a purchaser of a security under S 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
77b(11) (1976). Guild Film.s, 279 F.2d at 489. Section 2(11) defines the term "underwriter" for.
the purposes of the 1933 Act. See 15 U.S.C. 77b(11) (1976). The petitioners in the case were
pledgees seeking to avoid the registration requirements of the 1933 Act by claiming that the ac-
ceptance of pledged stocks did not make one a purchaser of a security interest. Guild Films, 279
F.2d at 489. The court held that the petitioners could not "be exempted on the ground that they
did not 'purchase' within the meaning of 5 2(11)." Id. Thus, the term "sale" was understood by
the court to include pledges and the term "purchaser," while not defined in the Act, was inter-
preted consistently with sale and held to include pledgees. Id. Although the court in Guild Films
reasoned that a pledge is a sale, such a determination may not have been necessary to resolve the
case. See 3 Loss, supra note 2, at 649.
20 See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1979); National
Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Rispo
v. Spring Lake Mews, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 462, 466-68 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
21
 See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295,
1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1979).
22 See, e.g. , Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d at 1040-41.
23 See, e.g. , National Bank of Commerce, 583 F.2d at 1298-1300.
24 National Bank of Commerce, 583 F.2d at 1299-1300.
25 Id. at 1300.
26 Id. In National Bank of Commerce, the court was considering the 1933 Act coterminous-
ly with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 78a-78kk (1976), as the petitioner
alleged claims arising under both Acts. National Bank of Commerce, 583 F.2d at 1297. See text and
notes at notes 127-37 infra for a discussion of the court's treatment of the petitioner's claim under
5 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court considered the policies of the two acts to
be the same, National Bank of Commerce, 583 F.2d at 1297. It referred to these policies as the
"meaning of the federal securities laws." Id. at 1300.
27 Id.
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ferent risks of loss, noting that pledgees have a principal loan note from the
pledgor upon which they can sue if the value of the pledged securities is insuffi-
cient to satisfy the debt." The court observed that investors have no such pro-
tection and thus assume a greater risk of loss than pledgees when entering a
securities transaction." The court concluded that the 1933 Act was designed to
protect only investors in the public securities markets, 3° and that considering a
privately negotiated pledge to be a "sale" under section 17(a) would be inap-
propriate."
In Rubin v. United States," the United States Supreme Court resolved this
dispute over whether a pledge of stock is an "offer or sale" of a security under
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act." In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,
the Court held that a pledge does fall within the protective sweep of section
17(a), at least when the fraud in question pertains to the pledged securities
themselves. 34 The Court did not reach the broader question of whether decep-
tive practices in such securities transactions which do not specifically relate to
the value of the securities themselves violate section 17(a). 35 Ruling that under
some circumstances the transfer of a partial interest in a security constitutes an
"offer" or "sale," 36 the Supreme Court held that a pledge transaction is one
such circumstance in which full title to a security need not pass for an "offer"
or "sale" to occur."
The defendant in Rubin, William Rubin, was the vice-president of a cor-
poration experiencing financial difficulties. 38 Rubin approached Banker's
Trust Company on behalf of the corporation in an effort to secure a five million
dollar loan to remedy these problems." Banker's Trust would not lend him the
money without collateral and adequate information concerning the corpora-
28 Id.
29 Id.
3° Id.
" Id. at 1299-1300. In addition, the court in National Bank of Commerce focused on the
fact that a pledge transaction does not alter the rights and privileges of the person holding title to
a security in the same way as does a sale. Id. at 1300. The court observed that a pledgee has no
"general property right" in the pledged stock, does not have normal shareholder rights, does not
participate in the stock's appreciation and has no right to dispose of the stock. Id. The court
viewed these limitations on the interest in a security transferred during a pledge transaction as
significantly distinguishing a pledge of a security from a sale of a security. Id.
32 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
33 Although the Court stated that the pledges in question were "offers or sales," id. at
431 (emphasis added), the Court clearly considered a pledge to be a sale rather than an offer.
When the Court described the pledge transaction, it used the language of S 2(3) which defines
sales, not offers. Id. at 429. The Court stated: "Obtaining a loan secured by a pledge of shares of
stock unmistakably involves a 'disposition of [an] interest in a security, for value'." Id. (quoting
5 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77b(3) (1976)) (brackets added by Court). See note 9 supra for
the definition of the term "sale" under the 1933 Act.
449 U.S. at 431.
" Id. at n.6.
36 Id. at 429.
32 Id. at 430.
'a Id. at 425.
39
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tion's financial condition. 40 In preparing the corporation's financial statements
and acquiring the collateral Banker's Trust requested, Rubin engaged in
numerous fraudulent practices." With regard to the financial statements, the
corporation's balance sheet listed a $7,500,000 contract as an account
receivable. This contract was nonexistent. 42 The balance sheet also listed in-
flated figures for cash on hand and the worth of its mineral reserves." Rubin's
actions in acquiring the necessary collateral were equally deceptive. Tri-State
pledged stock in six companies to Banker's Trust in exchange for a total of
$475,000 in loans." The stocks were represented to Banker's Trust as being
worth approximately $1,700,000 when in fact they were almost worthless." In
addition, the securities were represented as "good, marketable, and unre-
stricted" when actually they were either issued by shell corporations, rented
from the true owner for a fee solely for the purpose of misleading Banker's
Trust or otherwise restricted. 46 Rubin served as the corporation's agent in most
of these transactions."
Receiving an inquiry about Tri-State from the Justice Department shortly
after consolidating all of Tri-State's loans into a single demand note, Banker's
Trust demanded payment of the note." When Tri-State did not pay" Banker's
Trust sued on the note" and proceeded against Rubin personally as guarantor
of the loans.." Rubin signed a confession of judgment against himself for the
full amount of the loan plus accrued interest but soon thereafter filed a petition
in bankruptcy." Banker's Trust received only about one half of one percent of
the face value of its loan."
The Justice Department learned of Rubin's fraudulent practices and in-
dicted him for conspiring to violate federal statutes prohibiting fraud in connec-
tion with the sale of securities." Rubin had a jury trial in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York and was convicted." He
appealed the conviction on both evidentiary and statutory grounds." His
statutory claim was that a pledge of stock as collateral for a bank loan is not an
46 Id.
41 Id.
42 id.
45 Id.
" Id.
45 Id.
46
 Id.
41 Id.
4" Id.
" Id.
50
 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
59 Id.
54 Id. at 427 n.1. Rubin was also indicted for conspiring to commit fraud in the use of
the mail and wire systems. Id.
55 Id. at 428.
56 Id.; United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424
(1981).
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"offer" or "sale" of a security under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and,
therefore, his conviction for conspiring to violate that section of the securities
act was wrong as a matter of law." The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed his conviction, dismissing his statutory argument without com-
ment." Rubin again appealed his conviction, maintaining that although he
may have conspired to commit fraud in the pledge of securities," he had not
violated section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 6° He claimed that a pledge of securities
transfers to the pledgee only an implied right to dispose of the pledged
securities in the event of subsequent loan default and foreclosure." Rubin con-
tended that such a transfer was not an "offer or sale" of securities within the
meaning of section 17(a). An "offer or sale," he argued, would occur only
when Banker's Trust foreclosed on the pledged securities and thereby obtained
full title to them."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Rubin's
statutory claim." The Court held that Rubin's pledge of stock as collateral for
his bank loan was an "offer or sale" of a security under section 17(a). 64
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals." The
Supreme Court reasoned that protecting pledgees under section 17(a) was con-
sistent with the language, legislative history and policies of the 1933 Act. 66
The Court began its analysis by examining the language of sections 2(3) 67
and 17(a)68
 of the 1933 Act." The Court emphasized that section 2(3) defines
the term "sale" to "include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security, for value." 70 Similarly, the Court emphasized that section
2(3) provides that the term "offer" "shall include every attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for
value." The Court concluded that a pledge of stock as collateral for a loan
"unmistakably involves a 'disposition of . . . [an] interest in a security for
value.' "72
 The interest transferred by Rubin to Banker's Trust was described
by the Court as having three important characteristics. First, the pledges antici-
57 449 U.S. at 428.
58 Id, at n.5.; 609 F.2d at 66.
59 449 U.S. at 428.
66 Id.
61
 Id. at 428-29.
62
 Id. at 429.
65
 Rubin v. United States, 445 U.S. 960 (1980).
64 449 U.S. at 430.
65 Id. at 431.
66 Id. at 428-31.
67 See note 9 supra for the relevant text of 5 2(3).
68 See note I supra for the relevant text of § 17(a).
69 449 U.S. at 428-29.
7° Id. at 429 (emphasis added by Court).
" Id. (emphasis added by Court).
72 Id. (brackets added by Court).
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pated a "self-executing procedure" (foreclosure) through which the pledgee,
Banker's Trust, could obtain full title and ownership in the pledged securities if
the pledgor, Tri-State, defaulted on its obligations." Second, the self-executing
procedure was to be exercised at the option of the pledgee. 74 Third, the pledgee
had parted with valuable consideration when accepting the pledged securi-
ties." The Court deemed the interest transferred to Banker's Trust through the
pledges of securities as "inchoate but valuable."'" Ruling that it is not "essen-
tial under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee" for an offer or
sale to occur under the 1933 Act," the Court then concluded that the transfers
of such inchoate interests in securities could constitute sales under the 1933
Act."
The Court seemed to view its examination of the specific statutory
language of section 2(3) as the most important part of its analysis. The impor-
tance the Court attached to its textual analysis is evidenced by the Court's
separation of this portion of its opinion from the remainder of its opinion by a
new roman numeral heading." In addition, the Court began the new section
by stating: "when we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry
is complete, except in rare and exceptional circumstances." 8° The Court found
no such circumstances present in Rubin:" Nonetheless, the . Court went on to
analyze the legislative history and policies of the Act to support further its inter-
pretation of the Act's language."
Focusing on the legislative history of the 1933 Act, the Court concluded
that reading the term "sale" under section 2(3) to include pledges was entirely
consistent with the history of the Act.B 3
 The Court recognized that the language
" Id. Full legal title to pledged securities does not pass in a pledge transaction and can
only be obtained by a pledgee through a foreclosure action. JONES, Supra note 8, 4 at 7 & n.26.
" 449 U.S. at 429.
" Id. The Court did not indicate whether these characteristics are common to all pledge
transactions or only the transactions between Tri-State and Banker's Trust. Id.
76 Id. at 430.
" Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
85
 Id. While the Court suggested that the language defining the term "sale" in the 1933
Act is unambiguous, id., the meaning of the Court's assertion is unclear. One interpretation of
the Court's suggestion is that the Court found that the definition of "sale" unambiguously
covers pledge transactions. Another interpretation is that the term "sale" unambiguously em-
bodies the broader principle that the transfer of a partial interest in a security is a sale. Id. The
Court's examination of the legislative history and policies of the 1933 Act focused exclusively on
pledge transactions. Id. This focus indicates that the Court found the definition of "sale" under
the 1933 Act unambiguous in its inclusion of partial interests in securities transferred during the
type of pledge transaction which occurred in Rubin. The holding in Rubin, therefore, may not ap-
ply to transfers of partial interests in securities occurring outside of a pledge context.
61 Id.
" Id.
87
 Id.
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Congress used to define "sale" in section 2(3) was almost identical to the
language defining "sale" in a model "blue sky" 84 statute" which had been
adopted by many states at the time the 1933 Act was passed." A sale was de-
fined under the model statute to "include every disposition, or attempt to
dispose of a security or interest in a security for value. " 87 The Court noted that
one year before the passage of the 1933 Act, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
had held that the term "sale" under the model statute as adopted in California
encompassed pledge transactions. 88 The petitioner in Rubin, the Court stated,
had cited no authority to suggest that Congress had not incorporated the broad
definition given to the term "sale" under the model statute when enacting sec-
tion 2(3). 89 Therefore, the Court reasoned that it was consistent with the legis-
lative history of section 2(3) to include pledges within the meaning of "sale"
under that provision of the 1933 Act. 9°
Not content to rest its holding solely on statutory language and legislative
history, the Rubin Court extended its analysis of whether a pledge is a sale
under sections 2(3) and 17(a) to consider the purposes behind the Act. 91 The
Court determined that including pledges under the section 2(3) definition of
sale was consistent with the general purposes of the 1933 Act and the specific
purposes of section 17(a). 91 The purpose of the Act, the Court explained, was
to "protect against fraud and promote the free flow of information in the public
dissemination of securities." 93 In determining whether these purposes of the
Act would be served by holding that a pledge constitutes a sale under section
17(a) the Court focused on two issues. First, it assessed the relative risk of loss
assumed by purchasers of securities and by pledgees. 94 The Court observed
that the economic considerations and circumstances taken into account by a
direct investor are similar in "important respects" to the factors considered by
a pledgee when deciding whether to accept securities as collateral for a loan."
" The term "blue sky law" is used to describe state securities regulation statutes and
derives from the passage of the 1911 Kansas licensing statute. Supporters of the Kansas statute
claimed that it was directed at "promoters who 'would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee sim-
ple,' " 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 27 (quoting Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37, 37 (1916)).
" The model statute was the Uniform Sale of Securities Act, 449 U.S. at 430. The
defmition of sale in S 1(3) of the Act may be found in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS 174 (1929) (Fourth and
Final Draft) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. The Model Act was made obsolete
by the passage of the 1933 Act. 1 Loss, supra note 2, at 90.
86 449 U.S. at 430.
87 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 85, at 174.
" 449 U.S. at 430. The decision was Cecil B. DeMille Prods., Inc. v. Woolery, 61
F.2d 45, 50 (9th Cir. 1932).
89 449 U.S. at 430. The Court's reasoning reflected the well-settled principle that Con-
gress is presumed to have knowledge of the interpretation given existing law when incorporating
it into new law. Id. To support its reasoning, the Court cited its decision in Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 581 (1978), but did not discuss the above principle explicitly. Id.
9° Id.
91 id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
93 Id.
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Both investors and pledgees, the Court suggested, risk a loss on their respective
investments if the represented value of the securities in question is inflated. 96
Second, the Court considered whether the pledgee, like the investor, must rely
on representations made by the transferor of the securities. 97 The Court in-
dicated that a pledgee relies on the debtor's representations of the worth of
securities in accepting them as collateral in the same way that a direct investor
relies on his seller's representations. 98 The Court stressed that the transfer to a
pledgee of a defeasible rather than a full interest in the pledged securities does
not bear significantly on either the risk of loss assumed by a pledgee or the
reliance a pledgee places on a pledgor's representations concerning the value of
the pledged securities. 99 Deeming pledgees and direct investors similarly
situated with regard to the purposes of the 1933 Act, the Court concluded that
they should be accorded the same measure of protection under section 17(a).'"
Rubin resolved that pledgees are protected by section 17(a) of the 1933
Act."' It remains unclear, however, whether pledgees can enforce section
17(a) through a private action for darnages. 102 If Rubin can be used to resolve a
related issue arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),
the absence of a private cause of action for damages under section 17(a) will not
prevent defrauded pledgees from obtaining private relief from loss under the
federal securities acts. Federal courts of appeals are divided"' over whether a
pledge of stock as collateral for a commercial loan is a sale of a security under
the 1934 Act.'" If a pledge of stock is deemed a "sale" under the 1934 Act,
then defrauded pledgees logically should be considered "purchasers. " 1 05 As
96 Id.
97 Id.
96 Id.
99 Id.
'°° Id. While concurring in the opinion of the majority, Justice Blackmun stated that the
Court simply should have held that a pledge is a "disposition" of a security within the meaning
of 5 2(3). He suggested that the Court should not have examined whether a pledge involves the
transfer of an " 'interest in a security, for value.' " Id. at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In so
stating, Justice Blackmun seems to have been concerned that the Court may limit its
characterization of a pledge as a sale to the 1933 Act and not extend it to the 1934 Act. Such a
limitation of the Rubin holding might be reasonable if the two phrases "interest in a security" and
"for value" contained in 5 2(3) are determined to be the basis of the Court's holding. The defini-
tion of "sale" under the 1934 Act contains neither of these phrases. Section 3(a)(14) of the 1934
Act defines "sale" as including "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(14) (1976). Justice Blackmun cited the language of the 1934 Act in his concurrence. 449
U.S. at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101 See text and notes at notes 32-108 supra for a discussion of Rubin.
1" Courts of appeals disagree over whether a private cause of action exists under section
17(a) of the 1933 Act: Compare Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a private cause of action exists under 17(a)) and Kirshner v. United
States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a private cause of action exists under
S 17(a)) with Shull v. Dain, Kalamn & Quail, 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that no
private cause of action exists under 5 17(a)).
See text and notes at notes 110-54 supra for a discussion of the dispute concerning
whether a pledge is a "sale" under the 1934 Act.
104 Section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(14) (1976), defines "sale" for the
purposes of the 1934 Act and provides in relevant part: "The terms 'sale' or 'sell' each include
any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Id.
193 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme
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purchasers, defrauded pledgees would have standing to bring a private action
under section 10(b) 106
 of the 1934 Act.'" Therefore, if the language, legislative
history and policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts allow Rubin's holding under the
1933 Act to constitute authority for characterizing pledges as sales under the
1934 Act,'" then defrauded pledgees should have a right of action for damages
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.'° 9
This casenote will assess the impact of the holding in Rubin that a pledge of
stock is a "sale" of a security under the 1933 Act on pledgee standing to sue
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Because the language, legislative history
Court held that a plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of securities to maintain a private
action under 5 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 730-31. The Court stated that this requirement was
necessary to prevent the litigation of speculative claims filed primarily for settlement purposes,
id. at 740, and based only on oral evidence, id. at 743. See text and notes at notes 214-50 infra for
a complete discussion of the purchaser-seller requirement as it relates to pledge transactions.
105
 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. The administrative ruling under which § 10(b) is enforced is Securities Exchange Commis-
sion rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1981). This regulation provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,	 .
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
1°7 It is well established that a private cause of action exists under 5 10(b) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Nevertheless, the Court has never squarely held that such a cause of action
exists. See Casenote, A Scienter Requirement for SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b) - Investor Protection
Under the Securities Laws is Further Restricted, Aaron v. SEC, 22 B.C.L. REV. 595, 595 n.7 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as B.C. Casenote].
1" The Rubin Court never mentioned the 1934 Act in its opinion. See 449 U.S. at
424-31. Justice Blackmun, however, did mention the 1934 Act and one case interpreting the Act
in a pledge context. Id. at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Notwithstanding the absence of any
reference to the 1934 Act by the majority in Rubin, the Supreme Court in Weaver v. Marine Bank,
50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4286 (Mar. 8, 1982), has suggested in a footnote that Rubin applies to both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In Weaver, the Court observed that "[we] held in Rubin v. United States
. . . that a pledge of stock is equivalent to a sale for the purposes of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws." Id. at 4286 n.2. While the use of the term "laws" in this statement sug-
gests that Rubin should extend beyond the 1933 Act, the Court provided no analysis to support its
statement and did not recognize that the 1934 Act was not addressed or cited in Rubin. Id. The
issue resolved by the Court in Weaver was whether a certificate of deposit is a security under the
1934 Act. Id. at 4286. The Court held that a certificate of deposit is not a security, id., and did not
directly address whether a pledge is a "sale" under the 1934 Act. Id. Therefore, the Court's foot-
note on Rubin is dicta. Nonetheless, the Court's mention of Rubin in the context of a 1934 Act
case suggests that Rubin might be extended to the 1934 Act definition of "sale." See note 126 infra
for the facts of Weaver.
In
 Comparisons between 5 17(a) of the 1933 Act and 5 10(b) of the 1934 Act are ap-
propriate, particularly because 5 17(a) has been interpreted to cover both initial issuances of
securities and post-distribution transactions. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778
(1979). Thus, the Court's determination in Rubin that a pledge is a sale under 5 17(a) may not be
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and policies of the two Acts are so similar, it is submitted that Rubin may be
used to grant standing under section 10(b) to defrauded pledgees. The analysis
leading to this conclusion follows several steps. First, the debate among the cir-
cuit courts preceeding Rubin regarding whether a pledge of stock should be con-
sidered a "sale" of a security under the 1934 Act will be outlined. Then,
Rubin's impact on the debate will be assessed. The statutory language of sec-
tion 3(a)14 defining "sale" under the 1934 Act as well as the legislative history
and policies of the 1934 Act will be considered in light of the Rubin Court's
reasoning under the 1933 Act. This casenote demonstrates that the 1934 Act is
sufficiently similar in all these aspects to the 1933 Act to require that pledges be
considered sales under the 1934 Act after the Court's holding that pledges are
sales under the 1933 Act. Next, it will be shown that if pledges are deemed to
be "sales" under the 1934 Act, then pledgees should be deemed to be "pur-
chasers." The soundness of this result will be measured by its logic and also by
its consistency with the policies underlying the purchaser-seller standing re-
quirement established by the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.
Finally, it will be suggested that if Rubin leads to expansion of the class of plain-
tiffs granted standing under section 10(b), then such expansion should be
limited solely to defrauded parties to pledge transactions. Other holds of partial
interests in securities should not be granted standing on the authority of Rubin.
I. RUBIN'S IMPACT ON PLEDGEE STANDING UNDER SECTION
10(b) OF THE 1934 ACT
Courts have contested"° and commentators have considered"' whether a
pledge of stock as collateral for a commercial loan is a sale of a security under
limited to situations where initial issuances are involved. Indeed, since the Supreme Court's
decision in Rubin, two federal district courts have relied on the Court's interpretation of "sale"
under the 1933 Act in holding that a private cause of action exists under S 10(b) of the 1934 Act
for defrauded holders of a partial interest in a security. Set Oak Hill Cemetery, Inc. v. Tri-State
Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that the acceptance of securities as col-
lateral security on a note is a sale); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conway, 515 F.
Supp. 202, 210 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (holding that a contract for the delivery of a security at a fixed
price on a future date was a sale). See also Weaver v. Marine Bank, 50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4286 n.2
(Mar. 8, 1982) (footnote suggesting that Rubin extends beyond the 1933 Act). See note 108 supra
for discussion of Weaver.
Ito Compare Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
101 S.Ct. 3029 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4286 (Mar. 8, 1982); Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028-30 (6th Cir. 1979); and Mallis v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 828-30 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v.
Mallis, 434 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978) (all
holding that a pledge is a "sale" under the 1934 Act and that a pledgee is a "purchaser") with
Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-45 (7th Cir. 1979); and National Bank of
Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978) (both holding
that a pledge is not a sale under the 1934 Act and not reaching the issue of whether pledgees are
purchasers).
"' See Note, A Pledge of Stock in a Commercial Loan: "Purchase or Sale" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934?, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 669 (1979); Note, Applicability of Rule 10b-5 to Pledges of
Securities, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 547 (1980); Case Comment, Caveat Lender — Federal Securities Law
Does Not Apply to A Commercial Loan Secured by a Pledge of Securities, Lincoln National Bank v. Herber,
604 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1979). 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1227 (1980); Case Comment, Pledge of
Securities as Loan Collateral Does Not Constitute a "Sale" as Required by Antifraud Provisions of the
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section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 12 thereunder. These issues have
been the focus of the pledge debate under the securities laws because an indi-
vidual must be either a purchaser or a seller of a security in order to have stand-
ing to bring a private action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule
10b-5. 1 " Thus, a pledgee cannot bring an action for fraud under section 10(b)
unless pledgees are considered to be purchasers of securities. As a logical
precondition to a pledgee being deemed a purchaser, a pledge of securities
must be deemed to be a "sale"" 4 of securities. Five circuit courts of appeals
have addressed these issues. The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have held
that pledgees and pledge transactions are within the protective sweep of section
10(b) of the 1934 Act."' The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, however, have held
that section 10(b) does not encompass pledgees and pledge transactions.) t6 The
courts have divided primarily on three grounds. First, they disagree over
whether the language defining "sale" under the 1934 act is broad enough to
encompass pledges. Second, they reach differing conclusions on whether
pledgees assume the same risk of loss by accepting securities as collateral that
investors do when investing in the public securities market. And finally, they
perceive Congress' intent to regulate securities transactions outside of the
public markets in passing the 1934 Act differently. Rubin's holding that a
pledge is a "sale" under the 1933 Act helps to resolve these differences. First,
the language defining "sale" under both Acts is very similar and Rubin sug-
gests, therefore, that a pledge should be a "sale" under the 1934 Act. Second,
the Rubin Court stated that pledgees and investors assume risks sufficiently
similar to warrant similar protection. Third, Rubin did not directly address
whether Congress intended to regulate transactions outside of the public
securities markets. It will be shown, however, that other Supreme Court deci-
sions have settled the question in favor of broadly construing the 1934 Act and
that Rubin is simply consistent with them.
A. Is a Pledge a Sale of a Security under the 1934 Act?
1. The Background of Case Law
The reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Mallis v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Company'" is representative of the circuit courts which held
that a pledge is a sale under the 1934 Act. 118 In 'Wallis, the Second Circuit held
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Lincoln National Bank u. Herber, 604 F.2d
1039 (7th Cir. 1979), 11 Cum. L. REV. (1980).
1 " See note 106 supra for the text at S 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
1 " In Blue Chip Stamps a. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff must be a purchaser or a seller of securities to maintain a private cause of ac-
tion under 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 730-31. See text and notes at notes 214-22 infra for a
discussion of Blue Chip.
"4 See note 104 supra for definition of "sale" under the 1934 Act.
'" See note 110 supra for citation to courts endorsing this position.
"6 See id. for citation to courts endorsing this position.
1 " 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cm. granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S.
928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978).
See note 110 supra for cases following Mallis.
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that a defrauded pledgee can bring a private action for damages under section
10(b). 19 The court based its holding primarily upon earlier decisions under the
1933 Act in which the court had considered a pledge to be a "sale" of
securities."° The court did not conduct a close textual analysis of the definition
of "sale" in section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act. 121 Rather, it based its holding on
the similar investment risks assumed by direct investors in securities and
pledgees of securities.' 22 Pledgees were viewed as assuming an investment risk
"identical" to that of investors insofar as they both expected the securities they
accepted to have a continuing value.' 23 The court recognized that the protec-
tion of individuals undertaking such investment risks is the "undisputable
basis for statutory regulation of securities transactions.'" 24 The court conclud-
ed that there was no reason to treat transactions involving the same risks of loss
differently and determined that a pledge is a sale under the 1934 Act."' The
other courts which have held that a pledge is a "sale" under the 1934 Act have
added little to the Malls court's analysis of the issue.' 26
" 9 568 F.2d at 828-29.
120 Id. at 829; see United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 936 (1976); see text and notes at notes 11-19 supra for a discussion of Gentile.
121 See note 104 supra for the text of 5 3(a)14, 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(14) (1976).
122 568 F.2d at 829. The court in Mattis quoted the language concerning the risk
assumed by a pledgee directly from its earlier opinion in Gentile, 530 F.2d at 467. See text and
notes at notes 11-19 supra for discussion of Gentile.
125 568 F.2d at 829.
124 Id. (quoting Gentile, 530 F.2d at 467).
125 Id.
126 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d
1017 (6th Cir. 1979) followed the holding in Mattis. Id. at 1029. The Mansbach court noted that a
split of authority existed as to whether pledges were sales of securities under 55 3(a)14 and 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1028. The court summarized the arguments and authority on both sides of
the issue, id. at 1028-29, and concluded, simply, that the reasoning which considered pledges to
be sales was "better" than the reasoning that did not consider pledges to be sales. Id. at 1029.
The court offered no independent analysis to explain why it preferred a reading of "sale" under
the 1934 Act which included pledges to one that did not. Id. The Mansbach court did, however,
draw a clear distinction between its holding and the holding in Mattis. Id. at 1030. The issue in
Mansbach was whether a pledge of stock made to a securities broker-dealer as collateral for a
securities transaction was a "sale" subject to the proscriptions of 10(b). Id. at 1029. Mattis, in
contrast, involved a pledge of stocks as collateral for a commercial bank loan. Id. at 1029.
Without stating that pledges made to banks as collateral for commercial loans should not be sales
under 5 10(b), the Mansbach court stressed that it was not implicitly agreeing with Malls that they
should be considered sales. Id. Rather, the Mansbach court only held that a pledge is a sale under
the 1934 Act when made to a securities broker-dealer as part of a securities transaction. Id.
In Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 3029
(1981), rev'd on other grounds, 50 U.S.L.W. 4285, 4286 (Mar. 8, 1982), the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with those courts holding a pledge of a security to be a sale of a security under the
1934 Act. Id. at 163. In Weaver, the court held that the pledge of a certificate of deposit as col-
lateral for a bank loan was a sale of a security under the 1934 Act. Id. In so holding, the court
considered fraudulent acts done in connection with this "sale" to be violations of 5 10(b) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 78j(b) (1976), and therefore grounds for a private cause of action. Id.
Weaver, however, differs from the other cases which have considered a pledge to be a sale under
the 1934 Act in that the fraudulent acts in question were performed by the pledgee rather than the
pledgor in the pledge transaction. Id. at 162-63. Yet, the court paid little notice to this distinction
in relying on the reasoning of the cases which held a pledge to be a sale under S 10(b), when a
pledgor performed fraudulent acts in the transfer of a security interest. Id. The court observed
that "if a pledge is a purchase for the purpose of protecting a lender it is equally a sale for pur-
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In National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All American Assurance Co. , 127
 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of the Mattis court and
held that a pledge is not a "sale" under the 1934 Act.' 28 The National Bank of
Commerce court based its decision on the language of the statute 129 and on policy
grounds.'" The court observed that "sale" is defined in section 3(a)14 of the
1934 Act "to 'include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.' "131 The
court reasoned that Congress' failure to include specific reference to pledges in
this definition of sale indicated that it did not intend pledge transactions to fall
within the Act's protective sweep.'" Moreover, the court rejected the policy
argument that investors and pledgees assume identical risks of loss in accepting
securities."3 The court stressed that pledgees, unlike investors, have a claim on
a loan note for which the securities were pledged as collateral if the value of the
securities accepted proves to be less than anticipated.'" Finally, the court
observed that the securities laws were passed primarily to regulate the transfer
of securities in the public market.'" Accordingly, privately negotiated pledge
transactions were perceived by the court to be beyond the parameters of the
Act. 16 The court stated that such private transactions did not need federal pro-
tection. 137
In Lincoln National Bank v. Herber,' 38 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
followed the Fifth Circuit's determination that pledges are not sales of
securities under the 1934 Act.'" The difference between the reasoning of the
poses of protecting the pledgor." Id. The court did not inquire into the legislative history or
policies of the 1934 Act in arriving at its conclusion. Id. The court simply observed that it was in-
appropriate to presume that Congress "intended to exclude lending institutions extending credit
on the security of pledged collateral" from the prohibitive sweep of 10(6). Id.
122 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978).
124 Id. at 1300.
129 id.
' 3° Id.
" 1 Id. at 1298 n.4.
"2 Id. at 1300.
133 Id. After considering the argument that pledgees and investors undertake similar
risks, the National Ban* of Commerce court observed:
[T]his rationale might be a persuasive argument that the federal securities laws
ought to encompass pledges, as well as purchases and sales. It does little to support
a decision that,they in fact do cover pledges. Congress can be presumed to know
the difference between a collateral pledge transaction and a sale and purchase. If it
had intended to cover both, it could easily have done so by words traditionally
used to differentiate between the two.
Id.
134 Id.
133 Id.
136 Id .
127 Id. The Court also observed that a pledgee has no "general property right" in the
pledged stock, does not have normal shareholder rights, does not participate in the stock's ap-
preciation and has no right to dispose of the stock. Id. The court viewed these limitations on the
interest in a security transferred during a pledge transaction as significant in distinguishing a
pledge of securities from a more conventional sale of securities. Id.
I" 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979).
139
 Id. at 1044.
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court in Lincoln National and the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in National Bank
is that the Lincoln National court recognized that the language of section 3(a)14
of the 1934 Act defining "sale" was broad enough to encompass pledges. 140
The court, however, stated that reading the statute in a strict "literal" fashion
to include pledges under the definition of "sale" would be inappropriate in
light of section 3 of the 1934 Act."' Section 3 provides that the statutory defini-
tion of terms under the Act governs the application of those terms "unless the
context otherwise requires." 142
 In order to determine whether a "context over
text" 143
 approach to interpreting the Act was required, the court examined the
legislative history of the 1934 Act and the economic realities of pledge transac-
tions.'" The legislative history of the Act, the court stated, showed that Con-
gress was interested in controlling the flow of credit going into the public
securities markets and was not concerned with the use of credit for other pur-
poses.'" According to the court, the transfer of a partial interest in a security to
secure private credit has no bearing on the public securities markets and
therefore is outside the ambit of the 1934 Act.' 46
Turning to the "underlying economic realities" of pledge transactions,
the Lincoln National court rejected the assertion that pledgees assume a risk
identical to that of investors."' The court stated that pledgees assume a "com-
mercial" risk rather than an "investment" risk.'" The difference between
these two types of risk, the court indicated, rests on the purpose for which they
were assumed. 149
 The court observed that a pledgee accepts securities for the
purpose of securing a loan on which repayment is expected; an investor accepts
securities for the purpose of realizing a return on the securities themselves and
not on some other contractual arrangement.' 5° Therefore, the court reasoned,
a pledgee accepts only an "ordinary commercial risk incident to a loan transac-
tion" and not the sort of risk that investors assume."' An investor's risk is tied
solely to whether the securities accepted continue to have value.'" Thus, the
Lincoln National court concluded that a literal reading of "sale" under section
3(a)14 of the 1934 Act must be qualified by looking to the limited impact
140 Id. at 1040. See note 104 supra for text of 5 3(a)14.
14 ' Id. 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a) (1976).
142 Id. Section 2 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77b (1976), contains an identical provi-
sion.
145 604 F.2d at 1041.
144 Id. at 1040-44.
145 Id. at 1042.
146 Id. The court also noted that an original definition of "sale" in the 1934 Act did not
refer to pledges even though it contained a comprehensive list of other transactions which were
deemed to be sales. Id. See text and note at note 177 infra for the text of the original definition of
sale.
'" 604 F.2d at 1042.
HE' Id.
149 Id.
155 Id.
151 Id.
' 52 Id.
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pledges have on the securities markets and the commercial rather than invest-
ment nature of pledge transactions.'" To the court these qualifications con-
stituted the necessary "context" for interpreting the term "sale" under the
1934 Act. The court held that this context required that pledges not be con-
sidered sales.'"
2. The Impact of Rubin
The issue of whether a pledge is a "sale" under the 1934 Act has been
analyzed by the courts in terms of the statutory language, legislative history
and general policies of the 1934 Act. The courts are divided over whether the
absence of specific words including pledges under the section 3(a)14 definition
of "sale" precludes the characterization of pledges as sales. In order to resolve
this question, courts have inquired into the legislative history and general
policies underlying the 1934 Act. In an effort to determine whether pledge
transactions are the kind of transaction which Congress intended to regulate in
passing the 1934 Act, the courts have focused on whether pledgees assume a
risk of loss sufficiently similar to that assumed by investors to warrant the same
protection. In addition, they have considered whether Congress only intended
to regulate securities transactions affecting the public financial markets and, if
so, whether pledge transactions affect those markets.
The Supreme Court's decision in Rubin v. United States' 55 addresses the
specific considerations and can help resolve the issue of whether a pledge con-
stitutes a "sale" under section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act. Courts addressing
whether pledges are regulated by the 1933 or the 1934 Act have construed the
Acts similarly. No court considering the pledge issue under either Securities
Act has stated that the term "sale" be construed more broadly under one act
than under another.' 56 Since the term "sale" is treated uniformly under both
133 Id.
"4 Id. at 1044. The court did suggest that a foreclosure action by a pledgee after a
pledgor's default on loan payments would be an action sufficient to characterize a pledge as a
sale. Id.
155 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
"5 The 1933 and 1934 Acts have been tightly interwoven on the pledge issue. Both Acts
were discussed as a unit in all of the circuit court cases addressing whether pledge transactions are
protected under the 1934 Act. In National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583
F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978), the court observed that the definitions of "sale" under the two Acts
are "functionally equivalent" and considered simultaneously the plaintiff's claims that a pledge
is a "sale" of a security under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id. at 1298. Similarly, in Lincoln Nat'l
Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979), the court considered the plaintiff's claim that a
pledge is covered by $ 17(a) of the 1933 Act and $ 10(b) of the 1934 Act at the same time. Id. at
1040. Further, most courts addressing the question of whether a pledge is a "sale" under one of
the Acts either have relied in part on decisions under the other act, see Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball
& Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1039 (6th Cir. 1979) and Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568
F.2d 834, 829 (2d Cir.), cm. granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928 (1977),
cent. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978), or have referred to decisions under
the other act, see United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
936 (1976) and McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 42
U.S 930 (1975).
Because of this interlacing of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the parties in Rubin made much
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Acts in connection with pledges, Rubin' s holding, that the definition of "sale"
under the 1933 Act"' includes pledges, lends support to a similar reading of
"sale" under the 1934 Act. 158 In addition, the Rubin Court's analysis of the
legislative history of the term "sale" under the 1933 Act can assist in defining
the scope of the term "sale" under the 1934 Act. Finally, the Rubin Court's
discussion of the general policies of the 1933 Act provides important guidance
in assessing whether the policies of the 1934 Act supports a construction of the
term "sale" which includes pledges.
Following the methodology of the Court in Rubin, in order to determine
whether a pledge constitutes a "sale" under the 1934 Act, the first step must be
to examine the language of the Act itseff. 159 Section 3(a)14' 6° defines the term
"sale" as used in the 1934 Act. It defines the term to "include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of." 161 This language is very similar to the language in
the 1933 Act defining' sale" to "include every contract of sale or disposition of
a security or interest in a security, for value.' 162 The difference between the
provisions is that section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act does not explicitly state that a
"sale" includes a disposition of an "interest in a security." 163 Arguably, this
difference in statutory language could indicate that Congress intended the term
"sale" to have a broader meaning under the 1933 Act than under the 1934
Act. 164 A closer analysis of the language of section 3(a), however, rebuts this in-
ference. First, the language defining "sale" in section 3(a)14 employs the word
reference to the 1934 Act in arguing their respective positions. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 8-10, 12, Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); Brief for Petitioner at 13, 21, 23-26,
Rubin v. United States (1981); Brief for the United States, at ;5, 40, Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424 (1981).
'" 449 U.S. at 429-31.
"6 The Supreme Court has suggested that where the language and legislative history of
the two acts are similar it is appropriate to interpret the 1933 and 1934 Acts consistently. See
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
' 56 4-49 U.S. at 429. Chief Justice Burger began the Court's analysis in Rubin by stating:
"We begin by looking to the language of the Act." Id. Focusing on statutory language in this
way is a well-settled guiding principle for interpreting the securities acts. The principle reflects
the Court's concern for not extending statutes beyond their intended parameters. See Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
"° 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(14) (1976).
161 Id. See note 104 supra for text of provision.
' 62 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(3) (1976).
163 Section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act also does not require that the disposition in question
be "for value," as does 5 2(3) of the 1933 Act.
164 Justice Blackmun seemed attentive to this problem. He stated in his concurrence to
the majority opinion in Rubin:
The Court holds that a pledge confers an "interest in a security," and that
therefore a pledge of shares of stock as collateral for a loan constitutes a 'disposi-
tion of [an] interest in a security, for value' within the meaning of $ 2(3) of the Act,
15 U.S.C. 77b(3).... I would hold simply that a pledge of stock as collateral is a
type of 'disposition' within the meaning of section 2(3).
449 U.S. at 432. Justice Blackmun then cited language of the 1934 Act regarding "sale." Id.
Justice Blackmun seemed concerned that the Court will focus on the absence of "interest in a
security" in the 1934 Act definition of "sale" and later distinguish Rubin under the 1933 Act on
this basis.
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"includes" rather than "means" when setting the definition's parameters.
Generally, when the word "include" is used rather than "means" in a defini-
tion, the definition is to be read broadly. Second, section 3(a) states that the
definitions in the section are to be construed literally unless the "context" re-
quires a different interpretation. There are at least three contexts which require
qualification of the statute's literal language. This statutory language
evidences congressional intent to provide a flexible rather than restrictive
definition of the term "sale" under the 1934 Act.'"
The language of section 3(a)14 does not require that the term "sale" be
construed narrowly. Section 3(a)14 states that "the terms 'sale' and 'sell' in-
clude any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of. " 166
 Congress' use of the word
"include" in this definition is significant. Only five of the thirty-nine defini-
tions prescribed under the definitional section of the 1934 Act contain the word
"include."'" All other terms are defined by the use of the word "means.' "" It
is a principle of legislative drafting that the word 'include," when used in a
definition, suggests a partial definition of a term.'" In contrast, when a defini-
tion uses a word "means" it generally indicates an exhaustive definition. 170 If
this principle is applied to section 3(a)14 it would appear that the definition of
"sale" under the 1934 Act is not limited to "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." 171
 Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider pledges "sales"
under the 1934 Act even though the definition of "sale" in section 3(a)14 does
not explicitly mention pledges.
The definitional section of the 1934 Act contains other language which
also supports a broad reading of section 3(a)14. Section 3(a) of the Act states
16 ' See text and notes at notes 66-71 infra.
166
 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(14) (1976).
167
 15 U.S.C. SS 78c(a)(1) - c(a) (one of the other definitions is "purchase," S 3(a)13, 15
U.S.C. S 78c(a)(13) (1976)).
It should be noted that the state statute upon which the 1933 Act was modeled, the
Uniform Sale of Securities Act reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 85, used the word
"include" in setting out the definition of four of five terms defined in both the Model Act and the
1933 Act: "security," "person," "sale" and "dealer." Of these four terms, Congress used the
word "include" only in the definition of "sale." While Congress based the 1933 Act in part on
the Model Act, see text and notes at notes 90a-93 supra, the substitution of "means" for "in-
clude" by Congress in some definitions but not in others indicates an awareness of the different
construction given the two words.
In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1968), the Supreme Court noted the
importance of the word "include" in the definition of "sale" under the 1934 and 1933 Acts when
it observed:
"These sections [3(a)13 and 3 (a)14l do indicate the breadth of the statutory terms "purchase"
and "sale" by using the definitional word "include" and by including within the definitions con-
tracts "to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire" and "to sell or otherwise dispose of securities."
Id. at 467 n.8; accord, Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 at n.7 (1st Cir. 1968).
163 See 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(1)-(35) (1976).
169 See R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 93 (1954), See also 1 Loss supra note 2,
at 512 n.162.
' 7° See R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 93 (1954).
171 Loss has gone so far as to suggest that the 1934 Act does not define "sale" at all ex-
cept to the extent that "contracts to sell" transactions are clearly included in the notion of
"sale." 2 Loss, supra note 2, at 1097.
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that the terms used in the chapter are to be construed as defined "unless the
context otherwise requires.'"" Section 3(a), however, does not indicate the
factors relevant in determining the contexts that require other than strict ap-
plication of the terms defined under the Act. One such context could be that
section 3(a)14 uses "include" rather than "means" in its definition of sale. If
the word "include" is viewed as a special context for interpreting the language
defining "sale," then section 3(a) would also support a broad reading of
"sale" under section 3(a)14 of the Act. Other possible contexts which would
require a broad definition of "sale" would be decisions interpreting the same
or similar provisions under other acts, the legislative history of the 1934 Act,
and the general policies of the 1934 Act. Each of these "contexts" deserves
separate consideration.
The definitions of "sale" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts generally are con-
sidered to cover the same transactions. in More specifically, in cases discussing
pledge transactions, all courts of appeals have agreed that the term "sale" in
the two acts should be construed in the same way.'" Indeed, the definitions of
the term under the two Acts have been deemed "functionally equivalent.""s
In Rubin, the Supreme Court held that a pledge is a "sale" of a security under
the 1933 Act. 16
 Because courts have considered the definitions of "sale" under
both Acts to be the same, Rubin provides strong support for the proposition that
pledges also are "sales" under the 1934 Act. Therefore, in the "context" of a
Supreme Court decision interpreting a definition of sale similar to that con-
tained in section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act as including pledges, it is appropriate to
consider a pledge to be a sale under section 3(a)14.
Another "context" which might qualify a literal interpreation of section
3(a)14 is the legislative history of the 1934 Act. Holding a pledge to be a sale
under section 3(a)14 is consistent with this legislative history. One proposed
version of the Securities Exchange Act provided that the term "sale" should
"include any contract of sale or disposition of, contract to sell or dispose of, at-
tempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or in-
terest therein."'" This proposed definition of "sale," however, was not incor-
porated in full into the definition of "sale" which Congress passed in section
3(a)14 of the 1934 Act. As enacted, section 3(a)14 defines "sale" to include any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 1e Therefore, several changes were
"2 15 U.S.C.	 78c(a) (1976). See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038,
1040-41 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussing contexts within which terms of the 1934 Act should be inter-
preted).
1 " See cases cited at note 156 supra.
174 Id.
175
 National Bank of Commerce v. All Am.Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th
Cir. 1978).
176
 449 U.S. at 430.
'" See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2 Item 24, 43(12) at 7.
"B 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(14) (1976). This definition of "sale" was first proposed in H.R.
8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 28,
3(15) at 9. Other proposed bills contained no specific definition of "sale." See H.R. 7924, 73d
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made in the proposed definition to arrive at this final definition.'" First, Con-
gress deleted all reference to offers or solicitations of offers to sell. Second, the
phrase "contract of sale or disposition of " was removed in favor of the phrase
"contract to sell or dispose of." Third, the definition's specific statement that a
sale included any disposition of "a security or interest therein" was deleted.
Finally, Congress added the word "otherwise" to the phrase "contract to sell
or dispose of." None of these changes evidences a congressional intent to ex-
clude pledge transactions from the definition of "sale" under the 1934 Act.
The third change is the most significant with regard to Congress' intended
treatment of pledges under section 3(a)14. 1 " It is arguable that by not in-
cluding the phrase "a security or interest therein" in the definition of "sale"
under section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act, Congress intended to exclude transfers of
partial interests in securities from the category "sale." There is little legislative
history explaining why Congress did not include the phrase "a security or in-
terest therein" as part of section 3(a)14. 18 ' The records that do exist, however,
indicate that Congress did not intend to exclude transfers of partial interests in
securities from the category "sale" by choosing not to incorporate the phrase
"a security or interest therein" from the proposed definition into section
3(a)14. 152 Rather, Congress was concerned with making the definition of
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 26, at 13-16;
H.R. 8575, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item
27 at 8-9.
19 The following comparison of the differences between the definition of "sale" under
the 1934 Act as proposed and as ultimately enacted is based strictly on a comparison of the
language of the two definitions.
' 8° The first change eliminates offers from the category "sale." A pledge, however, is
considered to be a "sale," not an "offer," under the 1933 Act. See text and notes at 32-36 supra.
The second change merely consolidates two equivalent phrases into one. The last change, adding
the word "otherwise" to the phrase "dispose of," tends to enlarge the definition beyond the
original narrower phrase "contract to sell or dispose of." Making the phrase read "contract to
sell or otherwise dispose or does not seem to limit the sorts of transactions the definition of "sale"
was meant to encompass.
18 ' In Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979) the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals observed:
The definition of "sale" was not a topic to which much attention was devoted dur-
ing the course of the hearings on the Acts, but considerable legislative effort was
nevertheless expended in drafting the definition as evidenced by the length of the
original definition, which was gradually pared down until it reached its present
form.
It at 1042.
1 " The first definition of "sale" was proposed by Mr. Rayburn to the House of
Representatives on February 10, 1934 in H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) reprinted in 10
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 24. See text and note at note 177 supra. Five weeks
later, on March 19, 1934, the same Mr. Rayburn proposed the modified definition of "sale"
which appears in S 3(a)14 as part of H.R. 8720, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) reprinted in 10
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 28. See text and note at note 178 supra. During the in-
terval between Rayburn's introduction of the two proposed definitions of "sale," hearings on
H.R. 7852, which was the bill containing the longer version of the definition, took place. See
Hearings Be-ore the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 7852 and
H.R. 8720, 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 23 [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Only
two statements were made during these hearings which may bear on why Rayburn submitted a
new definition of "sale" in his second bill. First it was remarked that "the definitions, which
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"sale" more succinct so that criminal sanctions under the Act would be more
precisely construed. 183 There is no indication that Congress intended to change
the quality of transactions covered under the proposed definition of "sale"
when it made the definition more terse. Therefore, the fact that section 3(a)14
differs in significant ways from a proposed definition of "sale" under an early
draft of the 1934 Act does not prohibit characterizing a pledge as a "sale"
under the 1934 Act.'"
The legislative history of the 1933 Act adds further support to the position
that Congress intended pledges to be considered sales under the 1934 Act. The
Supreme Court has reasoned that since the same Congress passed the 1933 and
1934 Acts, the legislative history of one act can be used to interpret similar sec-
tions of the other Act. 185 Applying this principle of statutory analysis, the
legislative history of the term "sale" under section 2(3) of the 1933 Act 186 can
are .	 . broad and general, should be made more definite and specific. . . . " Id. at 154. This
statement related to all of the definitions of "sale" as a general statement suggesting a change in
the form of the definition but not the substance. Second, it was observed that the language in the
proposed definition of "sale" referring to "an attempt or offer to dispose" might "make a mere
conversation have the same legal effect as the action resulting from [a] conversation." Id. at 493.
This statement addresses whether offers should be considered sales and not whether transfers of
partial interests in securities should be considered sales. The statement does not bear on the latter
issue. Therefore, to the extent that Rayburn and the Congress were moved by the hearings on
H.R. 7852 to limit the definition of "sale" contained therein, the legislative history shows no in-
tention to eliminate transfers of partial interests in securities from the category "sale."
i" See Hearings, supra note 182, at 154 for statement raising concern regarding criminal
prosecutions.
184 Logic supports this position. It could be argued that the absence of the phrase "in-
terest therein" in S 3(a)14 evidences congressional intent not to include transfers of partial in-
terest in securities under the definition "sale." If this argument is accepted, however, one also
would have to accept that Congress intended to remove all transactions in securities from the
category "sale" since Congress did not explicitly use the word "security" in defining "sale"
under 3(a)14. It is unlikely that Congress intended the definition of "sale" under the Securities
Exchange Act not to include securities transactions. It is equally unlikely, therefore, that absence
of the words "interest therein" reflects an intent to exclude transfers of partial interests in
securities from the category "sale."
Some support for the proposition that Congress' failure specifically to mention partial in-
terests in securities as part of the language of a section in the securities acts does not indicate con-
gressional intent to exclude such interests from the section can be derived from the 1933 Act. Sec-
tion 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(11) (1976), has been construed to cover pledge trans-
actions even though specific mention of pledges was dropped from the language of the statute as
ultimately enacted. See SEC v. Guild Films, 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub fern. San-
ta Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (1960). In Guild Films, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals focused on the legislative history of the 1933 Act concerning which transactions were to be
exempted from the Act's registration requirements to support the proposition that a pledge
should be considered a sale under the 1933 Act. Id. at 489. The court focused on a proposed pro-
vision of the Act which would have exempted from the Act's registration requirements transac-
tions made in an effort to liquidate bona fide debts under a pledge contract. Id. See H.R. 4314,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 512(b) (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 22, at
22. The court noted that Congress had rejected the proposed provision. 279 F.2d at 489. The
court appeared to consider Congress' rejection of this provision as an implied inclusion of pledges
under the Act's regulation and protection. See id.
185 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
'" See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1042 & n.5 (1979) for an analysis
of the 1934 Act in light of the legislative history of the 1933 Act. See note 9 supra for the text of
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be used to interpret the term "sale" under section 3(a)14 of the 1934 Act. In
describing the definition of "sale" in the 1933 Act, one of the drafters of the
Act stated that the term had been taken from the Uniform Sales of Securities
Act "as nearly as we could draft it."'" The Rubin Court pointed out that
under the Uniform Sales of Securities Act pledges were characterized as sales
and concluded that Congress intended to include pledges under the 1933 Act
definition of sale.' 88 Following Rubin, one would have to conclude that Con-
gress also intended to include pledges in its definition of "sale" under the 1934
Act. This conclusion is supported by the absence of any statements in the
legislative history of the 1934 Act suggesting that the term "sale" under the
two acts was intended to cover different transactions.'" It would seem that if
Congress had intended to make such an important distinction between the
1933 and 1934 Acts it would have said so.
In addition to being consistent with the language of section 3(a)14 and the
legislative history of 1934 Act, holding a pledge transaction to be a "sale"
under section 3(a)14 is supported by the "context" of the policies underlying
the 1934 Act. Courts which have considered the propriety of characterizing
pledges as sales and thereby extending the proscriptions against fraud in sec-
tion 10(b) to pledge transactions have focused primarily on two policy issues.
An initial concern has been whether Congress intended the 1934 Act to cover
the transfer of partial interests in securities occurring in privately negotiated
transactions."° In addition, the courts have assessed whether pledgees assume
investment risks sufficiently similar to those assumed by direct investors to
warrant their protections under the 1934 Act.' 91
Some courts have asserted that a privately negotiated pledge should not be
considered a "sale" of a security because the 1934 Act only relates to transac-
tions impacting the public securities markets.' 92 Limiting the regulatory sweep
of the 1934 Act to such transactions unduly restricts the policy focus of the 1934
Act. While securities acts were directed primarily towards securities transac-
tions in the public financial markets, 193
 the acts were concerned with other
section 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976), which defines'"sale" under the 1933 Act.
1 e 7
 See The Securities Act of 1933: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item
21, at 76.
188
 449 U.S. at 430.
189 See S. REP. NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 17, at 14; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted
in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, Item 18, at 17. When the reports discuss significant
changes made in the definitions of the 1934 Act no mention is made of the "sale."
19° See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1979); Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978).
' 9 ' See, e.g. , Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1979);
Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 828-30 (2d Cir.) cert. granted sub nom. Bankers
Trust Co. v. Manes, 434 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388
(1978).
182
 See text and notes at notes 133-37, 145-46 supra.
183 See FitzGibbon, supra note 2, at 913. See also 15 U.S.C. S 78b (1976) regarding the
necessity of securities regulations in the public financial markets.
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securities as well.'" The broad scope of the 1934 Act is exemplified by section
10(b). That provision prohibits fraud or misrepresentation in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities which are registered on a national exchange
and in the purchase or sale of securities not so registered.'" Indeed, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the purpose of section 10(b) is not confined
to preserving the integrity of the public securities markets. 196 The Court has
observed that in section 10(b) "Congress meant to bar devices and con-
trivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in organized
markets or face to face."'" Loss can result from fraudulent acts not connected
with transactions in the public markets. It would be unduly restrictive to inter-
pret section 10(b) as covering only transactions directly affecting the public
financial markets. Section 10(b) indicates that Congress was interested in pre-
venting fraud in securities transactions as well as preserving the integrity of the
public securities markets generally.' 98
 Therefore, whether pledge transactions
affect the public securities markets is not dispositive of whether the policies of
the 1934 Act are consistent with characterizing a pledge as a sale. Rather, pro-
hibiting fraud in securities transactions, whether those transactions are con-
ducted in the public market or privately, is an equally important policy con-
sideration of the 1934 Act. This policy of fraud prevention would be fostered by
considering a pledge of securities to be a "sale" under section 3(a)14.' 99
Since the impact of pledges on the public securities markets will not deter-
mine whether the policies of the 1934 Act support construing the term "sale"
to include pledges, other policy considerations must be assessed. The only
other main policy of the 1934 Act considered by the courts addressing whether
a pledge should be a sale under the 1934 Act concerns risk of loss. Courts focus
' 94 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975). In Blue Chip,
the Court observed that "the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was described as an Act to provide
for the regulation of securities exchanges of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate com-
merce . . to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for
other purposes." (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
195
 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976). See note 106 supra for text of 510(b).
I56 See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979). In Naftalin, the Court ad-
monished: "prevention of frauds against investors was surely a key part of [the securities laws],
but so was the effort 'to achieve a high standard of business ethics . . in every facet of the securities
industry. ' " Id. (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 186, 186-87(1963)) (emphasis
added by the Naftalin Court).
' 9 ' Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life Sr Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). Ex-
tending 5 10(b) beyond the securities markets is consistent with the policy of interpreting the 1934
Act flexibly while remaining consistent with congressional intent. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 1977); Harrison v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,
435 F. Supp. 281, 285 (W.D. Mich. 1977). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (by implication).
198
 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976), states only that it shall be unlawful for a
person to engage in deceptive practices "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
(emphasis added). The provision imposes no requirement that the sale of the securities be con-
ducted in the public markets or that it not be privately negotiated.
199
 That the 1934 Act includes 510(b) as a general fraud provision evidences that fraud
prevention is a major focus of the 1934 Act.
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on the similarity between the risk of loss assumed by a pledgee in accepting
securities and that of an investor accepting securities for consideration. 2"
There is little question that one of the primary purposes of the 1934 Act was to
provide protection for investors in securities. 20 ' If pledgees assume a risk of loss
similar to that of investors, however, it is reasonable to extend to them the
same protections under the Act that investors enjoy. In Rubin, the Supreme
Court observed that the risk assumed by a pledgee in a pledge transaction is
"similar in important respect[s] to the risk an investor undertakes when pur-
chasing shares. " 202 Based on this reasoning, the Court held thatpledgees war-
rant the same protection under the 1933 Act as do investors. 205 The nature of
the risk assumed by pledgees of securities and investors in securities inheres in
the transactions themselves and exists whether or not the transactions are
regulated by the securities laws. Therefore, Rubin's holding that pledgees
deserve the same protection under the 1933 Act as do investors suggests that
pledgees and investors should be treated similarly under the 1934 Act as
wel1. 204 Following Rubin, it is appropriate to view the "context" of providing
investor protection as supporting the characterization of pledges as "sales"
under the 1934 Act.
A third policy concern not mentioned by courts considering whether
pledges are "sales" under the 1934 Act provides additional support for con-
cluding that pledges should be considered "sales." The securities acts were
passed in an effort to restore the confidence of investors in securities which had
been lost during the 1929 stock market crash. 205 By restoring investor con-
fidence in securities, Congress hoped to encourage the flow of money and
thereby strengthen the economy. 246 Protecting pledgees under the 1934 Act by
considering pledges to be "sales" would foster the confidence of lending in-
stitutions in pledged securities and encourage the flow of money through the
economy. Therefore, the policy of encouraging the flow of money through the
economy would be served by treating pledges as sales under the 1934 Act. For
example, a small "honest business" 2" may need to raise capital through a
200 See text and notes at notes 121-25 and 132-36 supra for cases discussing risk of loss.
201 See note 2 supra.
702 449 U.S. 424, 431 (1981).
Id.
204
	
could be argued that this risk analysis under $ 17(a) is not applicable to 5 10(b) of
the 1934 Act because the 1933 Act covers the initial issuances of securities while the 1934 Act
covers post-issuance transactions. Therefore, the two Acts apply to different transactions. See 1
Loss, supra note 2, at 130. This argument is weak because any distinction which may exist be-
tween the scope of 5 17(a) of the 1933 Act and 5 10(b) of the 1934 Act on this basis is negated by
the Supreme Court's holding that 17(a) covers fraudulent actions both during the initial is-
suance and later trading of securities. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979).
207 See 15 U.S.C. 78(b) (1976). It has been suggested that the impact of the 1929 stock
market crash was heightened by the reluctance of investors to buy securities after losing con-
fidence in them during the initial crash. See FitzGibbon, supra note 2, at 916. See generally Sargent,
The SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REV. 553,
662-75 (1974).
206 See note 2 supra for a statement of general policies behind 1933 Act.
207 Id.
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bank loan. If securities constitute part of the collateral the business pledges for
the loan it is essential that the bank have confidence that the securities actually
have the value which the pledgor claims. As the Rubin Court observed, the
bank as pledgee assumes the same risk that the securities it receives will be
worth less than expected as does a direct investor. 2" Federal regulation of
pledge transactions under the 1934 Act would encourage pledgees to have con-
fidence in the represented value of pledged securities in the same way that it en-
courages investors to have confidence in purchased securities. The greater the
bank's confidence that the purported value of the securities which the honest
business pledges as collateral for a loan represents their full value, the more
willing the bank will be to make the loan. By making the loan the bank would
help to increase the flow of money through the economy. 209 Therefore, building
the confidence of lending institutions in pledged securities by considering
pledges to be "sales" would promote the 1934 Act's policy of encouraging the
flow of investment capital through the economy.
In conclusion, the absence of any specific reference to pledges in the 1934
Act's statutory definition of "sale" does not preclude characterizing a pledge
as a sale. By using "includes" rather than "means" in its definition of "sale,"
Congress evidenced an intent to bring more transactions under the category
"sale" than the definition explicitly provided."° In addition, the "context over
text" requirement of section 3(a) lends further support for a reading of "sale"
which is not confined to the explicit language of the statutory definition. In
light of Rubin, the context over text approach to defining "sale" strongly sup-
ports characterizing pledges as sales under the 1934 Act. The "contexts" of
statutory language, legislative history and general policies of the 1934 Act all
support following Rubin's holding that a pledge is a sale under the 1933 Act and
considering pledges "sales" under the 1934 Act. Therefore, the broad scope of
the term "sale under the 1934 Act provided by Congress in the statutory
language of sections 3(a)14 and 3(a) of the Act suggests that pledges should be
considered sales after Rubin.
Characterizing pledges as "sales" under the 1934 Act, however, does not
208 See text and notes at notes 94-98 supra for a summary of Rubin's treatment of the
relative risks assumed by pledges and investors.
299 The Supreme Court has used similar analysis in holding brokers of securities pro-
tected under 5 17(a) of the 1933 Act. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773-77 (1979). In
Naftalin the Court observed that "the welfare of investors and financial intermediaries are inex-
tricably linked — frauds perpetrated upon either business or investors can redound to the detri-
ment of the other and to the economy as a whole." It at 776.
2 " Construing the term "sale" in this fashion is consistent with the general policy of en-
couraging flexibility in the application of the securities acts. See United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768, 773 (1979); Affiliated the Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life Sr Casualty Co., 404 U.S 6, 12 (1971); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). This flexibility theme, however, must be tempered by the re-
cent trend in Supreme Court decisions to strictly construe access to private actions under 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. See note 216 infra. A strict textual approach to defining the scope of the term
"sale" under the 1934 Act might lead the Court to look beyond the functionally equivalent
nature of the term under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see National Bank of Commerce v. All Am.
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end the inquiry into whether pledgees of stock have a private cause of action for
damages under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) prohibits deceptive
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities"' and courts have
implied a private right of action for losses resulting from such practices. 212 That
losses have resulted from deception in connection with the sale of a security,
however, is only the first step in bringing a private action under section 10(b).
In addition, the party bringing the action must be deemed to be a purchaser of a
security. 213
 Therefore, even though a pledge may be deemed a "sale" under
the 1934 Act, a pledgee cannot bring a private action under section 10(b)
unless pledgees are considered to be "purchasers" of securities.
B. Is a Pledgee a Purchaser of Securities Under Section 10(b)?
The 1934 Act does not explicitly grant a private cause of action to in-
dividuals aggrieved by fraudulent practices which violate section 10(b). 214
Rather, courts have implied a private cause of action to enforce the prohibi-
tions of the provision. 215 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
limited the class of plaintiffs who can sue under section 10(b) by impressing
restrictions on the sort claims which can be brought under section 10(b). 216
One such restriction is a standing requirement that a plaintiff suing under sec-
tion 10(b) must be either a purchaser or seller of securities."' As explained by
the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps a. Manor Drug Stores, 218 the primary pur-
pose of the restriction is to prevent vexatious litigation based on speculative
claims of loss filed in some instances only for harassment purposes. 219 The Blue
Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978), and hold that the absence of specific
language in the 1934 Act characterizing the disposition of an interest in a security as a sale man-
dates that pledge transactions not be considered sales.
2" See note 106 supra for the text of S 10(b).
212
 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
213 Blue Chip Stamps V. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975). See also Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)
(first court to establish purchaser-seller requirement).
2 ' 4 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
213 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Kardon was
the first case to establish a private right of action under 5 10(b). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). In Kardon, the court focused on the Restatement of Torts
S 286 (1934), which states that an individual is liable for tortious conduct if s/he violates a
legislative enactment prohibiting actions which would injure a specific class of individuals which
the statute sought to protect. 69 F. Supp. at 513. See generally B.C. Casenote, supra note 107, at
595 n.7 (summary of cases establishing private action under S 10(b)).
216 The Supreme Court has restricted standing to sue under 5 10(b) in three ways. First,
5 10(b) does not govern claims of corporate mismanagement, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 426, 477 (1977); second, proof of scienter is required to find a S 10(b) violation, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); third, a plaintiff must be an actual purchaser or
seller of securities to bring an action under S 10(b), Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
217
	 Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
216
219 Id. at 740-41. The Blue Chip Court was concerned about plaintiffs filing "strike"
suits. Id. at 740. The Court described such suits as claims filed simply for the sake of harassing a
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Chip Court indicated that Congress did not intend to extend a private cause of
action to all "bystanders" 22° to the securities markets when it passed section
10(b) and tried to restrict the class of 10(b) plaintiffs to those who actually par-
ticipate in securities transactions. 221
While the Blue Chip Court resolved that only "actual purchasers and
sellers of securities" can sue under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,'" the Court
failed to define the terms "purchasers" and "sellers" with any precision. 223
Thus, it has remained unclear after Blue Chip whether a person defrauded in
connection with the transfer of a partial interest in a security meets the
purchaser-seller standing requirement.'" Equally unresolved is the more
defendant into settling a frivolous claim because the inconvenience of the suit to the defendant, in
terms of time and money, would outweigh the advantage of winning in protracted litigation. Id.
at 740-41. The Court viewed such claims as unfair to unwary and innocent defendants. Id.
220 Id. at 733, 752-54. The Court indicated that Congress did not intend to protect by-
standers to the securities market, such as non-purchasing offerees. Id.
221 Id. at 747, 752-55. The plaintiff in Blue Chip was an offeree of a stock offering made
pursuant to an antitrust decree. Id. at 725. The plaintiff alleged that it did not purchase the of-
fered stock due to the offeror's prospectus which "was materially misleading in its overly
pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and future prospects." Id. at 726. The Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff had no standing to sue because private actions under S 10(b) are limited to
actual "purchasers and sellers" of securities and do not encompass frustrated offerees. Id. at
730-31. In holding that plaintiffs must be purchasers or sellers of securities to bring a private ac-
tion under S 10(b), the Court resolved a dispute among the circut courts of appeals. The "pur-
chaser-seller" requirement was first articulated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cm. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). At the time that Blue Chip was decided the
requirement had been widely accepted. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731. In Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974),
however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the purchaser-seller requirement. Id. at
660. Moreover, prior to Blue Chip, many courts had avoided adhering strictly to the purchaser-
seller requirement in certain situations. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944,
948 (6th Cir. 1973) (beneficiary of trust); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.
1970), cm. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973) (forced seller exception); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 212 (2d Cir. 1968) (derivative shareholder suits where the corporation is a purchaser or
seller of securities); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967) (ac-
tions seeking injunctive relief); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967)
(defrauded broker suing client who refused to pay for ordered stock); Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 206-207 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (trustee in
bankruptcy). For articles discussing the ambiguity of the purchaser-seller requirement prior to
Blue Chip, see generally Boone & McGowan, Standing To Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV.
617 (1971); Kellog, The Inability to Obtain Analytic Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 is
Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era
for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968). See also authorities cited in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 721, 768-69 n.3 (1975).
272 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 730.
223
 See generally Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80
DICK. L. REV. I, 36-40 (1975); Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the
Purchaser-Seller Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 965 (1976); Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores:
Perpetuation of a Loophole in Rule 10b-5 Protection, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 706 (1976). Some of the old ex-
ceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement have resurfaced since Blue Chip on the principle that
they are consistent with the Blue Chip policies: Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1386 (5th Cir.
1980) (forced seller exception); Fuchs v. Swanton Corp., 482 F. Supp. 83, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(injunctive relief); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1093 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (beneficiary of trust); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 901-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (pur-
chase by broker for client).
22* Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 730-31. See McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991, 994
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specific question of whether pledgees should be considered "purchasers" and
granted standing to sue under section 10(b). Once a pledge of securities is
deemed to be a "sale" under the 1934 Act, however, pledgees should be
deemed to be purchasers. First, case law uniformly supports construing the
term "purchaser" to include pledgees once pledges are deemed to be "sales."
No case addressing the issue has held otherwise. Second, the statutory
language of the 1934 Act supports the same conclusion. The definition of "pur-
chase," and by implication "purchaser," under the 1934 Act is so much like
the definition of "sale" under the Act that "purchaser" and "sale" should be
read in a complementary fashion. And finally, the Blue Chip policy of
discouraging vexatious litigation is fostered by characterizing pledgees as pur-
chasers under the 1934 Act. Pledgees are parties to contracts on the basis of
which loss from fraud can be determined. Therefore, the claims they bring will
not be totally speculative and will be easily spotted when frivolous or instituted
only to harass the defendant.
1. Case Law
Two courts which have characterized a pledge as a sale under the 1934 Act
have addressed whether a pledgee meets the purchaser-seller standing require-
ment set out in Blue Chip. 225
 In Mallis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Company 2, 6 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that if the term "sale" is construed
to include a pledge, the term "purchaser" should be construed consistently to
include pledgees. 227
 The court provided no analysis of statutory language in ar-
riving at this conclusion, but seems to have relied on the obvious sensibleness
of the proposition for its support. 228 The Mallis court observed that considering
a pledgee to be a purchaser of securities is consistent with the policy behind the
purchaser-seller requirement — preventing a limitless class of plaintiffs
litigating speculative claims. 229
 The court stated that pledge transactions are
based on loan contracts. The court reasoned that claims of loss based on pledge
(E.D. Pa. 1977). The court in McCloskey held that the transferor of a voting trust certificate was
not a "seller" of a security. Id. at 995. But see Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F.
Supp. 1080, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Gross, the court held that the beneficiary of a trust for
which securities were bought was a purchaser of securities under the purchaser-seller require-
ment. Id.
225
 See Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435
U.S. 381, 388 (1978); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir.
1979).
226
 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S.
928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978).
227
 568 F.2d at 829.
22e
	 Maths court also relied on its earlier holding in SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279
F.2d 285, 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (1960), in
asserting that once a pledge is characterized as a sale, a pledgee should be characterized as a pur-
chaser under the 1934 Act. Mattis, 568 F.2d at 829 n.9. See note 10 supra for a discussion of Guild
Films.
229
 568 F.2d at 829.
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transactions are no more speculative than claims of loss based on more "tradi-
tional" sales agreements. 230 Therefore, the court stated, granting standing to
pledgees would not create an open-ended class of plaintiffs. 23 ' Hence, the court
held that defrauded pledgees of securities are "purchasers" under Blue Chip. 232
Similarly, in Mansbach v. Precott, Ball & Turben 233 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a defrauded pledgee of securities was a purchaser under Blue
Chip and has standing to sue under section 10(b). 234 The Mansbach court did not
question whether a pledgee should be considered a purchaser after it had
characterized a pledge as a "sale." Rather, it merely assumed that the terms
"sales" and "purchaser" should be read consistently. 235 It passed on the issue
without comment. 236 The court did note, however, that pledge transactions
arise in the context of concrete rights and expectations."' Therefore, it con-
sidered its holding consistent with the policies of Blue Chip. 298
2. Statutory Language
The statutory language of the 1934 Act also supports construing the term
"purchaser" to include pledgees once a pledge is considered to be a "sale."
The Act does not provide a definition of "purchaser" but it does define the
term "purchase." 239 Section 3(a)13 of the 1934 Act states that a "purchase"
"include[s] any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. , 9240 The
language of this section is very much like that of section 3(a)14 of the Act. Sec-
tion 3(a)14 defines "sale" and provides that sales "include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of. "241 Congress' use of such similar language in defining
"purchase" and "sale" 242 indicates that it intended these terms to be con-
strued uniformly. 243 In addition, construing the terms "purchase" and "sale"
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
2" 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
234 Id. at 1029-30.
235 Id. at 1031.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1030.
239 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1976).
240 Id.
241 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(14) (1976). See note 104 supra for text of provision.
242 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1976).
243 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.19 (1976). The Court
remarked:
To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose is one thing. To draw
on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal meaning of words is
quite another.... After all, legislation when not expressed in technical terms is
addressed to the common run of men and is therefore to be understood according
to the sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words
addressing him.
Id. (quoting Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944). This rule of
common sense construction should be applied to the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" under
the 1934 Act as there is no indication that they were not meant to cover the same transactions.
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inconsistently would lead to the anomalous situation where parties on different
sides of the same securities transaction would receive different protection under
the Act. In Blue Chip, the Court indicated that the 1934 Act protects both pur-
chasers and sellers of securities. 244 This casenote has shown that in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Rubin, it is appropriate to consider the section
3(a)14 definition of "sale" to include pledges. 245 To maintain consistency be-
tween the terms "sale" and "purchase" under the Act, if a pledge is con-
sidered a "sale" from the pledgor's point of view, then a pledge likewise should
be considered a "purchase" from the pledgee's point of view. Assuming that
one who "purchases" is a "purchaser," a pledgee should be considered a pur-
chaser under the purchaser-seller standing requirement established by Blue
Chip.
3. Policies behind Blue Chip
Finally, the policies behind Blue Chip purchaser-seller requirement for
standing to sue under section 10(b) support granting standing to defrauded
pledgees. The primary goals of the purchaser-seller requirement are to
eliminate section 10(b) claims based on speculative losses instituted for either
harassment or settlement purposes and to prevent the class of litigants suing
under section 10(b) from becoming limitless.'" Granting standing to defraud-
ed pledgees would not encourage the "vexatious litigation" 247 that the Court
seeks to curtail. The loss which would be claimed by pledgees suing under sec-
tion 10(b) would be the unpaid amount of the debt for which the securities were
pledged.'" Hence, the damages claimed by pledgees would be readily ascer-
tainable on the basis of the contract. Such claims would not be speculative and
would be less likely to be filed only for malicious reasons. In addition, granting
standing to pledgees would not create a limitless class of plaintiffs. Pledgees are
easily identified by the existence of a pledge contract. 249 Because pledge trans-
actions require such contracts, granting standing to pledgees would not open
the class of plaintiffs suing under section 10(b) to "bystanders" to the securities
markets who "await developments on the sidelines without risk" and later
claim losses based on fraudulent acts or omissions. 2" Allowing pledgees to sue
under section 10(b) would create a limited class of federal litigants whose losses
would be based on their actual participation in securities transactions.
The relevant case law, statutory language of the 1934 Act and policies of
244 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
245 See text and notes at notes 110-213 supra.
246
 421 U.S. at 733, 740, 752-54; Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824,
829 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dis-
missed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978).
247 Id.
2" JONES, supra note 8 5 5 at 9. The terms of a pledge agreement are formalized in a con-
tract. Jones writes that "[tihere must, however, be a contract, either expressed or implied to con-
stitute a pledge." Id. The existence of a contract reduces any possible speculative quality in a
pledge transaction which would conflict with the concerns of Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 742.
249 See note 248 supra.
456 Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 747.
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the Blue Chip purchaser-seller standing requirement all are consistent with
characterizing a pledgee of stock as a "purchaser" of securities. Therefore,
defrauded pledgees should have standing to sue for damages under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act.
II. LIMITS OF RUBIN
In Rubin, the Supreme Court relied on the language, legislative history
and policies of the 1933 Act to hold that a pledge of securities is a "sale" of
securities under the 1933 Act."' In light of this decision, it is equally ap-
propriate to characterize a pledge of securities as a "sale" of securities under
the 1934 Act. Analyzing the relevant statutory language, legislative history and
policies of the 1934 Act against the backdrop of the Court's reasoning in Rubin
makes it clear that pledges should be deemed sales under the 1934 Act. 252 In
addition, following Rubin and characterizing a pledge as a "sale" under the
1934 Act leads to the further conclusion that pledgees of securities should be
considered "purchasers" of securities under the 1934 Act. 253
 Characterizing
pledgees as "purchasers" under the 1934 Act is significant because, as pur-
chasers, pledgees could maintain a private action for damages under section
10(b) for fraud in connection with the pledge of securities. 254
 It has been sub-
mitted that allowing such private actions is consistent with the Supreme
Court's effort to restrict the scope of private damage actions under section
10(b). 255
While granting standing to pledgees is consistent with the Court's concern
for restricting the class of plaintiffs eligible to sue under section 10(b), Rubin
might also be read to support the grant of standing under section 10(b) to
holders of partial interests in securities other than pledgees. This possible ex-
tension of Rubin exists because the Rubin Court established the principle that
"it is not essential under the terms of the [1933] Act that full title pass to a
transferee for the [securities] transaction to be an 'offer' or 'sale.' "256
 The
Court applied this principle to hold that the transfer of a partial interest in a
security in a pledge transaction is a "sale" under the Act. 257
 Under the
authority of this principle, however, other transfers of partial interest in
securities also could be characterized as "sales." If other transfers are so
characterized, then transferees of other partial interests in securities might be
considered "purchasers" for the purposes of standing in a private action under
section 10(b). Hence, using Rubin to support standing for pledgees in private
actions under section 10(b) may open the door of section 10(b) private actions
to all holders of partial interests in securities. Such a great expansion in the
class of plaintiffs eligible to sue under section 10(b) would run counter to the
251 Rubin, 449 U.S. at 430-31.
2"
 See text and notes at notes 155-209 supra.
253
 See text and notes at notes 213-50 supra.
254
 See text and notes at notes 217-24 supra.
255 See note 205 supra for cases restricting private actions under S 10(b).
"6 Rubin, 449 U.S. at 430.
25r
	 at 431.
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Court's concern for restricting standing in such suits. Therefore, Rubin's ap-
plication to section 10(b) private actions must be limited.
The principle established in Rubin that full title to a security need not pass
for a "sale" of a security to occur 258 should be limited to pledge transactions.
The principle, if broadly read, would appear to extend beyond pledge transac-
tions and encompass transfers of other partial interests in securities. The struc-
ture of the analysis in Rubin, however, indicates that the Court was only con-
cerned with the "inchoate" interest transferred in a pledge transaction when
stating that transfers of partial interests in securities could constitute sales. 259
The Court's statement that "it is not essential under the terms of the Act that
full title pass to a transferee for the transaction to be an 'offer' or 'sale' " fol-
lows a description by the Court of the specific interest in a security transferred
in a pledge transaction.'" In this description, the Court recognized that the
partial interest in a security transferred through a pledge is an "inchoate but
valuable interest" 261 having three characteristics: pledgees obtain a power to
gain full title to the securities through a "self-executing procedure" if the
pledgor defaults on its obligations; 262 the self-executing procedure is exercised
at the option of the plegee; 263 and a pledgee parts with valuable "con-
sideration" to obtain the pledged securities. 264 By positioning its elaboration of
these characteristics of a pledge immediately after the statement that it is not
essential for full title to pass for a "sale" to occur, the Court seems to suggest
that it is not essential for full title to pass only when the inchoate interest
created by a pledge transaction is transferred.
This restrictive reading of the Rubin Court's statement of principle is sup-
ported by the Court's analysis of the legislative history and policies of the 1933
Act. 265 In addressing the legislative history of the Act, the Court did not focus
on whether Congress intended to include transfers of partial interests in
securities generally in the definition of "sale" under the Act. 266 Rather, the
Court only examined the legislative history of the Act as it related specifically to
pledges. 267 Similarly, the Court only analyzed whether the 1933 Act's policy of
protecting individuals against loss in securities transactions extends to
pledgees. 268 The Court made no mention of the Act's concern for holders of
other partial interest in securities. 269 Therefore, a close reading of Rubin in-
dicates that the Court had no intent to create a principle for defining the term
"sale" under the securities acts which extends beyond the context of pledges.
2" Id. at 430.
259 See id. at 429.
268 Id. at 429-30.
261 Id. at 429.
262 Id.
269 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 430.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 431.
269 Id.
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The danger that Rubin may be used to enlarge greatly the class of plaintiffs
suing under section 10(b) would be obviated by restricting the decision solely to
pledge transactions. Restricting Rubin's impact on the definition of "sale"
under the securities acts to pledges would limit Rubin's support for expanding
the class of section 10(b) plaintiffs to pledgees. If Rubin were viewed as applying
only to pledges and parties to pledge transactions, then Rubin would not open
the door of section 10(b) private actions to holders of all partial interests in
securities. Hence, Rubin can be construed to support the grant of standing
under section 10(b) to defrauded pledgees of securities without undercutting
the Court's concern for restricting such private actions.
CONCLUSION
Defrauded pledgees of stock should be granted standing to sue for
damages under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. In Rubin v. United States the
Supreme Court relied on the language, legislative history and purposes of the
1933 Act to conclude that a pledge of a security is a "sale" of a security under
the 1933 Act. The similar language, history and policies of the 1934 Act war-
rant following Rubin when interpreting the term "sale" under the 1934 Act. A
pledge also should be deemed to be a sale under the 1934 Act. Once a pledge is
characterized as a "sale" under the 1934 Act, pledgees should be considered
"purchasers" of securities under Blue Chip. Both the language of the 1934 Act
and logic require this conclusion. Since section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides a
private cause of action for purchasers of securities who suffer loss from
fraudulent acts in connection with a "sale" of securities, defrauded pledgees
should be allowed to sue for damages under section 10(b). Granting standing to
pledgees in such actions does not frustrate the efforts of the Court to restrict the
class of plaintiffs who can sue under section 10(b). Allowing pledgees to sue for
damages is consistent with the Blue Chip policy of preventing vexatious litiga-
tion.
While Rubin conceivably could support a cause of action under section
10(b) for holders of partial interests in securities other than pledgees, this result
need not follow from granting standing to pledgees. Rubin can and should be
confined to its facts. A principled reading of the Court's opinion indicates that
the Court meant only to bring pledges within the meaning of the term "sale."
Therefore, holders of other kinds of partial interest in securities should not be
deemed "purchasers" and considered eligible to sue under section 10(b).
ALBERT ANDREW NOTINI
